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The Antitrust Provisions of
The Treaty of Rome*
David R. Fryer
The Treaty of Rome was signed on March 25, 1957, and the European Economic Community (EEC) entered into operation on January
1, 1958. Six states are parties to the Treaty: France, The Federal German Republic, Italy, Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg.
The aim of the Community is expressed in article 2 of the Treaty.
It shall be the aim of the Community, by establishing a Common
Market and progressively approximating the economic policies of Member States, to promote throughout the Community a harmonious development of economic activities, a continuous and balanced expansion,
an increased stability, an accelerated raising of the standard of living
and closer relations between its Member States.1
The Community therefore depends on the establishment of a common
market for the realization of
its aim. Instead of relying
THE AuTHOR (B.A. in Jurisprudence, B.C.L,
merely on the removal of tarOxford University) is a Solicitor for the North
iffs and quotas on trade beRiding County Council, Yorkshire, England.
tween Member
quotas
d
tween
States, tra
asaswould
be appropriate in the case of a
customs union, the Treaty envisages in addition, both the gradual approximation of the economic policies of the Member States, and the
establishment of a uniform customs wall surrounding the Community
from within which the Member States will pursue a common commercial
policy toward non-member states.
To achieve its aims, the Treaty provides for an international executive designated as the Commission. The Commission is charged with
implementation of the Treaty provisions, subject to control by the Council. The Council provides the link between the Community and the
national governments of the Member States; it is through the Council
that policy decisions are made. Although the Commission's function is
to initiate and develop proposals whereby the objectives of the Treaty
may be attained, these proposals must normally be placed before the
Council for policy decision.
*

This article is based on the transcript of a lecture delivered by the author at Western

Reserve University School of Law. It purports to be no more than a guide to the more important antitrust provisions of the Treaty.

Numerous contentious problems are, therefore,

ignored.
1. There is no official English text of the Treaty of Rome [hereinafter referred to as Treaty].
The translations of the articles of the Treaty and of Regulation 17, as quoted in this article,
are taken from an unofficial text which is Crown Copyright and which is reproduced by
kind permission of the Controller of Her Majesty's Stationary Office in London.
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The provisions of the Treaty apply to all aspects of industry, commerce, and services within the Community, subject to certain specific
exceptions the most important of which is the production and distribution of coal and steel which falls within the terms of the Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community. This Community entered into operation on July 25, 1952.2
In view of the size of the markets involved, the impossibility of foreseeing all the economic measures that may become necessary in these
markets, and the recognition of political realities, the Treaty is essentially
a framework treaty. For example, many portions of the Treaty are confined to statements of principle which may require further implementation, either by regulations and directives of the Council, or by legislation
enacted by Member States.
The Treaty provides few "dirigistic" powers permitting direct Community intervention in the processes of the market to cope with economic fluctuations or imbalance since it is intended that the market will
be governed by its own auto-mechanism relying on the forces of normal
competition. In the absence of such regulatory powers, it was therefore
imperative that the drafters of the Treaty should establish a climate in
which competition could flourish. Consequently, the Treaty contains
many provisions directed to the removal of obstacles to, and the protection of, workable competition. Clearly, the removal of tariffs and
quotas on trade between Member States would not achieve the aim of
the Treaty if enterprises were free to substitute their own arrangements,
or if Member States were free to enact measures or follow policies designed to perpetuate the status quo. Thus, to achieve the aim of the
Treaty, account must be taken of monopolistic and market-sharing practices, and it is necessary to subject enterprises to rules protecting competition to insure that dual prices do not replace customs duties, to prevent
dumping, and to prevent the replacement of quotas by market-sharing
arrangements.
Article 3 of the Treaty states that the rules designed to protect competition are intended to insure that the aims expressed in article 2 can be
achieved; however, the suppression of anti-competitive practices is not
regarded as an end in itself, but rather as part of the broader economic
purpose of the Treaty. The consultative procedures prescribed by the
Treaty, and the fact that the provisions of the Treaty are to be enforced
by administrative bodies lend support to the view that economic considerations will play a major part in the application of these rules protecting competition.
The enforcement and supervision of the rules protecting competition
2. The Treaty was signed on April 15, 1951.
Community see articles 65 and 66.

For rules protecting competition within this
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are entrusted to the Commission' which is composed of nine members,
each of which is head of a particular department. The department
primarily concerned with the enforcement of the rules of competition
is the Department of Competition which is divided into two branches:
one dealing with anti-competitive measures by Member States, and the
other with anti-competitive arrangements involving enterprises. Decisions under the rules are rendered by the full Commission.
Although the Treaty contains provisions designed to prevent Member States from disturbing the processes of free competition, this survey
will be confined to those provisions which have particular reference to
activities of enterprises. These provisions, articles 85 to 90, may be
regarded as the antitrust law of the Community.
RESTRICTIVE AGREEMENTS -

ARTICLE

85

In brief, article 85 is an anti-cartel provision. Article 85 (1) prohibits certain restrictive trading agreements and concerted practices;
article 85 (2) declares such prohibited agreements to be null and void;
article 85 (3) provides for the exemption of certain agreements and
practices which would otherwise fall within the prohibition of article
85 (1), if they satisfy certain conditions and have prescribed beneficial
effects.
Article 85(1)
Article 85 (1) declares:
The following shall be deemed to be incompatible with the Common
Market and shall hereby be prohibited: any agreement between enterprises, any decisions by associations of enterprises and any concerted
practices which are likely to affect trade between the Member States
and which have as their object or result the prevention, restriction or
distortion of competition within the Common Market....
In attempting to decide whether any particular trading arrangement
violates this general prohibition, it should be noted that the text gives
rise to many difficulties of interpretation, some of which are still unresolved.
To fall within the prohibition of article 85 (1), an arrangement must
involve at least two enterprises; it is therefore important to determine
the correct interpretation of the term "enterprise." It has been suggested
that it is unlikely that arrangements between a parent company and its subsidiary would fall within the provisions of this article, though whether
such arrangements involve two enterprises will probably be decided in
light of economic realities and the degree of de facto control and auton3. Article 89 requires that the Commission shall insure the application of the principles
laid down in articles 85 and 86.
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omy enjoyed. Decisions rendered by the Court of Justice in 1962 under
the European Coal and Steel Community Treaty have held a whollyowned subsidiary and its parent to be one enterprise even though the
subsidiary was treated as a distinct legal entity for tax purposes.4
Although these decisions may provide some guidance to the interpretation
of article 85, the degree of control which must exist before the notion
of separate enterprises is excluded still remains unclear. Even greater
doubt surrounds the status of arrangements existing between two subsidiaries. In one view, it is argued that arrangements between two
wholly-owned, or even controlled, subsidiaries of the same corporation
should be treated in the same way as arrangements between two branches
of the same corporation, i.e., as involving one enterprise. Another approach would determine the number of enterprises involved on the basis
of whether the actual business decisions were made by the subsidiaries
themselves, or directed from above. Under this approach, if the two
subsidiaries act on instructions from the common parent in entering into
the agreement, such arrangements would be treated as involving but
one enterprise.
It is probable that joint ventures in which both participating companies must give their approval for important decisions will be regarded
as involving two enterprises. In view of these unresolved problems of
definition, it would appear safer for the time being to treat all such
arrangements as though they involve two or more enterprises, unless
the contrary clearly appears.
Although article 85 (1) is primarily directed to horizontal agreements between competing enterprises, as exemplified by the term "concerted practices," vertical as well as horizontal arrangements may fall
within its prohibition. The article lists a number of typical anti-competitive practices which are usually found in vertical arrangements,
namely, tie-in clauses and discriminatory terms of sale.5
Decisions of Associations.-The reference to "decisions of associations" in article 85 (1) takes account of the existence in certain industries
of associations of manufacturers and distributors, which may make "recommendations" as to prices and output and thus may resort to blacklisting. In this connection, it should be noted that article 85 applies to
tacit cartel arrangements as well as to those reduced to writing. The
term "concerted practices" is probably intended to prohibit conscious
parallelism - common conduct entered into in the absence of legal
obligations (agreements) or relationships (associations).
4. Mannesmann A.G. v. High Authority of the Coal and Steel Community, Case No. 19/61,
July 13, 1962, Ct. of Justice; Kleckner Werke A.G. v. High Authority of the Coal and Steel
Community, Case No. 17/61, July 13, 1962, Ct. of Justice.
5. Treaty art. 85, para. 1(d), (e).
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Effect on Trade.-One of the most important requirements which

must be present before an arrangement can be prohibited under article
85 (1) is that the arrangement must be likely to affect trade between
Member States. Arrangements between firms situated in a single Member State which have an effect only on intrastate trade are not prohibited.
Such arrangements must be dealt with, if at all, under the national antitrust laws of the state involved. However, as the Common Market
economy becomes more integrated, it is more likely that an effect on

interstate trade will be discovered.

For example, an arrangement in-

volving firms in a single Member State could have interstate effects if
it regulated or prohibited imports or exports between Member States,

i.e., by dividing markets to stop exports to other Member States. Also,
arrangements which permit exports but prohibit re-imports, or which
provide for joint buying in another Member State would have interstate
effects.
It should be appreciated, of course, that arrangements may affect
trade between Member States and fall within the prohibition even though
they include participants from non-member states. This is of particular
relevance to American corporations which have business relations with
enterprises in the EEC. The prohibition of article 85 may apply both to
arrangements entered into by a subsidiary established within the Community, and to arrangements entered into by an American corporation
with enterprises situated in the community for the establishment of a
distribution network, or for the manufacture and sale of goods under
license. Whether the prohibition applies in any particular case will, of
course, depend on the facts. It is dear, however, that an awareness of, and
compliance with, the antitrust provisions of the Treaty is essential to
American corporations which seek to uphold such contractual relationships.
Divergent terms in the four authorized texts of the Treaty have
caused difficulties of interpretation with respect to the required effect on
trade. The French, Italian, and Dutch texts imply that the arrangement
need only be "capable" of affecting trade ("susceptibles d'affecter").
But since the enforcement agencies will probably be initially concerned
only with practices which have a clear-cut relation to interstate commerce,
reliance ought to be placed on the German text which requires that the
arrangement should be "likely" to affect trade. The German, Dutch,
and Italian texts also imply that the effect must be prejudicial, and in
view of the broad economic purposes underlying the antitrust provisions
of the Treaty, it seems likely that "adverse effect" will be read into the
text.
Object or Result.-Arrangements can only be prohibited by article
85 (1) if they have the prescribed anti-competitive effect. The arrange-
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ment must have the "object or result" of preventing, restricting or distorting competition within the Common Market. It appears that "object"
and "result" are determined in light of existing and foreseeable circumstances. However, it has been suggested that "object" should be established by reference to the agreement as a matter of construction, and
that "result" should be determined only after detailed investigation.
Common Market.-According to the Commission, the term "Common Market" refers to a geographical unit.6 This means that the repercussions of the arrangement on competition must be felt within the
geographical limits of the Common Market. On this basis, arrangements
relating solely to the export trade of one Member State with countries
outside the Common Market are not prohibited.
Typical Practices.-In addition to enacting the general prohibition
discussed above, article 85 (1) lists certain typical practices' which may
fall within the general prohibition. This list is indicative and not exhaustive. There is no presumption that the listed practices are likely
to have an adverse effect on trade between Member States; this must be
determined on the particular facts.' Furthermore, it is not clear whether
there is a presumption that the listed practices prevent, restrict, or distort
competition, although it is considered unlikely that a per se approach
will be adopted. On this matter, the Commission has shown a desire
to proceed pragmatically.
In the last analysis, whether an arrangement is prohibited depends
on whether it is likely to have a prejudicial effect on trade between
Member States, and has the object or result of preventing, restricting or
distorting competition within the Common Market. Fortunately, the
Commission has further clarified the scope of article 85 (1) by stating
officially that exclusive distributorship agreements involving commercial
agents and certain patent licensing agreements are outside the prohibition
of article 85 (1).
6.
7.

E.E.C. Commission Third General Report No. 140, 1960; Bulletin No. 38, May 1959.
Article 85(1) lists the following practices:
(a)
the direct or indirect fixing of purchase or selling prices or of any other trading
conditions.
[In Part I of its Practical Guide concerning artides 85 and 86 and the relevant regulations,
published in September 1962, the Commission suggested that typical examples would be rebates, discounts and terms for deferred payment.]
(b)
the limitation or control of production, markets, technical developments or investment.
[The Practical Guide suggests as examples: the allocation of production quotas and the
fixing of maximum production capacity.]
(c)
market-sharing or the sharing of sources of supply.
[The Practical Guide instances agreements to sell only in a given area or to provide for
mutual respect of national markets.]
(d)
the application to parties to transactions of unequal terms in respect of equivalent
supplies, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage.
[This would be the case if certain customers were granted unjustified advantages to the
8. E.E.C. Commission Third General Report No. 140, 1960.
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Exclusive Distributorships
In its second statemene concerning the application of article 85 (1)
to exclusive distributorship agreements, the Commission outlined the
procedure it would adopt in dealing with requests for exemption under
article 85 (3) and applications for negative clearance with respect to
exclusive distributorship agreements when one party to the agreement
is a commercial agent. In such cases, the Commission intended to give
favorable consideration to applications for negative clearance. However, this statement has since been superseded by a further statement"
(published December 24, 1962) which attempts a comprehensive definition of the term "commercial agent." This statement makes it plain
that exclusive agency contracts made with a commercial agent in which
the agent agrees, for a specified part of the Common Market territory,
to negotiate transactions on behalf of another enterprise, to conclude
transactions in the latter's name and for the latter's account, or to conclude transactions in his own name and for the latter's account, are not
within the prohibition of article 85(1). Accordingly, no question of
negative clearance arises. The statement emphasizes that the contracting
party designated as a commercial agent must actually be such by reason
of his functions, and must not undertake or engage in the activities of an
independent merchant. This would be the case if provision were made
expressly or tacitly for the assumption of the financial risk involved in
the sale or performance of the contract. Except for the case of del
credere guarantee, it is not a function of a commercial agent to assume
any of the risks involved in the transaction. He is likely to be regarded
as an independent merchant if he is required to keep, as his own property, considerable stocks of goods covered by the contract; or if he is
required to organize, maintain, or guarantee substantial and free service
to customers at his own expense, or does in fact do so; or if he can or
does determine prices or terms of business.
The Commission takes the view that contracts for exclusive representation concluded with commercial agents do not restrict competition
within the Common Market since in the commodity market the comdetriment of the competitive position of other customers. For the prohibition to apply, two
competitors must be treated differently; there is no prohibition against unequal conditions
of trade as applied to parties who are not in competition with one another.)
(e) the subjecting of the conclusion of a contract to the acceptance by a party of additional supplies which, either by their nature or according to commercial usage,
have no connection with the subject of such contract.
(This covers the typical tie-in clause whereby customers or suppliers are obliged to buy or
sell some other merchandise simultaneously or to accept or provide some other service unconnected with the original merchandise or service.]
9. 113 Official Gazette of the European Communities 2628 [hereinafter cited as Official
Gazette].
10. 117 Official Gazette 2687.
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mercial agent only plays an auxiliary part, and works according to the
instructions and interest of the enterprise for which he is acting. He is
neither buyer nor seller, but seeks out buyers or sellers for the benefit
of the other party to his contract. The latter actually does the buying
or selling, and is consequently not out of the picture as a competitor.
In the particular market in which commercial agents offer their services,
the commitment to work exclusively for one employer for a certain
period of time results in a limitation of supply on that market; the commitment of the other party to make him the exclusive agent for a specified territory involves a limitation of demand on that market. Nevertheless, the Commission regards these restrictions as resulting from the
special obligation to protect each other's interests which exists between
the commercial agent and his principal.
It should be noted that exclusive distributorship agreements involving independent merchants are not removed from the scope of article
85 (1). But, whether such an agreement falls within the prohibition
will depend on the facts of the particular case.
Patent Licensing Agreements
In its second statement" relating to patent licensing agreements, the
Commission proposed to except certain restrictions imposed on the licensee in individual contracts from the prohibition of article 85 (1). On
December 24, 1962, however, the Commission issued a further statement12 extending and superseding the contents of the prior statement.
Consequently, clauses in patent licensing agreements which impose obligations on a licensee are not within the prohibition of article 85 (1)
insofar as these obligations are an integral part of the licensor's rights
under the patent monopoly. Thus, obligations may be imposed on
a licensee limiting the methods of exploitation provided for by patent
law, limiting manufacture of the patented product or use of the patented
process to certain technical applications, limiting the quantity of products
to be manufactured, or limiting exploitation. Exploitation may be
limited either in time,"3 space,14 or as to person.' 5 The statement expressly declares that the listed obligations on the licensee do not represent
an exhaustive definition of restrictions which can be regarded as falling
within the scope of the rights conferred by the patent. The statement
also removes from the prohibition of article 85 (1) obligations on the
11. 113 Official Gazette 2628.
12. 139 Official Gazette 2922.
13. E.g., a license of shorter duration than the patent.
14. E.g., a regional license for a portion of the territory for which the patent is granted,
or limited to one place of exploitation.
15. E.g., limitation on the licensee's power of disposal, by a prohibition on assignment or
the granting of sub-licenses.
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licensee to mark the product with an indication of the patent. The
Commission has stated' that this type of obligation serves the patentee's
legitimate interest in insuring that the product is clearly shown to owe
its origin to the patented invention, and does not restrict competition
since the licensee may also affix distinguishing marks of his own choice
on the protected article. Obligations on the licensee to maintain quality
standards, or to procure certain products that are indispensable to the correct technical exploitation of the patent are also removed from the prohibition of article 85 (1). Obligations of this type are imposed to prevent a
technically improper exploitation of the invention, and as in the first case
do not restrict competition. However, all of these obligations are outside
the prohibition of article 85 (1) only insofar as they are imposed on the
patent licensee. On the other hand, the only obligations on the licensor
removed from the prohibition of article 85 (1) by the statement are those
in which the licensor agrees: (1) not to authorize any other person to
utilize the invention, and (2) not to utilize the invention himself. The
Commission does not feel that the first type is likely to affect trade between
Member States. The second type is essentially an assignment of rights.
The statement also provides that agreements concerning the communication of know-how acquired during the utilization of the invention,
or the granting of licenses relating to improvements, or new uses, are
outside the prohibition of article 85 (1); however, obligations accepted
by the licensee in this connection are valid only if they are not exclusive
and the licensor has assumed similar obligations. The licensee's acceptance of such obligations does not restrict competition so long as he
can transmit such know-how, grant licenses to third parties, and participate in know-how and experience acquired by the licensor in the future. These are the only reciprocal obligations excluded by the statement from article 85 (1).
It is important to note the exact limits of the declaration of inapplicability comprised in the statement of December 24, 1962. It does not
include clauses in patent licensing agreements other than those expressly
removed from the prohibition of article 85 (1). Therefore, article 85 (1)
will continue to apply to clauses in patent licensing agreements such as
those which are expressed to endure beyond the term of the patent, or
those which impose a prohibition on exports. Moreover, the declaration
of inapplicability does not extend to multiple parallel licenses, reciprocal
licenses, agreements concerning joint ownership of patents, patent pending
arrangements, or the utilization of other industrial property rights such
as trademarks or know-how. As a result, it is an open question as to
whether the Commission will regard obligations of the types listed in the
statement as being outside the prohibition of article 85 (1) when they
16.

139 Official Gazette 2922.
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are contained, for instance, in a trademark license agreement.'" The
application of article 85 (1) to all such agreements must at present be
determined by the general principles of applicability.
As a result of the Commission's statements, commercial agency and
patent license agreements which come within the categories described
therein, are outside article 85 (1). All other agreements must be scrutinized in light of the broad prohibition and the particular practices specified in article 85 (1) to determine whether they fall within its terms.
REGULATIONS

26 AND 141

Before considering the nature and scope of article 86, it should be
noted that the range of goods and services to which articles 85 and 86
originally applied has been significantly amended by Regulations 26
and 141.
Regulation 26"s provides that articles 85 to 90 of the Treaty shall
apply to all agreements, decisions, and practices referred to in articles
85 (1) and 86 dealing with the production of, or trade in, the products
listed in Annex II of the Treaty, i.e., agricultural produce. Regulation
26(2) provides, however, that article 85(1) shall not apply to those
arrangements which form an integral part of a national market organization, or which are necessary for the attainment of the objectives set out
in article 39 of the Treaty.' In particular, it does not apply to arrangements between farmers or farmers' associations belonging to a single
Member State, relative to the production or sale of agricultural produce,
or the use of joint storage, treatment, or processing facilities for agricultural produce in the absence of any obligation to charge a specific
price, unless it is specifically found that the effect is to eliminate competition. The Commission decides which arrangements fulfill the requirements for exemption under Regulation 26(2).
Regulation 14120 provides that implementing Regulation 17 shall
not apply to agreements, decisions, and concerted practices relating
to transport which have the object or effect of fixing the cost or conditions of carriage, of limiting or regulating offers of carriage, or of
dividing traffic markets; nor shall it apply to dominant positions in the
traffic market within the meaning of article 86.1 This Regulation,
which accordingly exempts transport from the provisions of articles 85
and 86, recognizes the necessity for modified rules of competition related
17.
that
18.
19.
20.
21.

In paragraph III of the Statement issued on December 24, 1962, the Commission stated
a decision would eventually be made on this question.
Regulation 26 was made on April 4, 1962 and amended by Regulation 49, art. 1.
These relate to the establishment of the Community's agricultural policy.
Effective March 13, 1962.
Regulation 141, art. 1.
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to the special nature of transport. Rail, road, and river transport are
exempt only until December 31, 1965; before that date the Commission
must submit new proposals to protect competition in these fields."
DOMINANT POSITION -

ARTICLE 86

Article 86 declares:
To the extent to which trade between any Member States may be affected thereby, action by one or more enterprises to take improper
advantage of a dominant position within the Common Market or within
a substantial part of it shall be deemed to be incompatible with the
Common Market and shall hereby be prohibited....
The prohibition in this article takes the form of "abuse" legislation. It
does not prohibit the attainment of a dominant position, nor provide
for prior authorization of concentrations, but prohibits dominant enterprises from taking improper advantage of their position. Moreover, it
is subject to the important qualification that it applies only to the extent
that the improper exploitation affects trade between Member States.
The abuse of a dominant position in a single state may involve the
abuse of a dominant position within a substantial part of the Common
Market, but to come within the prohibition, it must also be shown to
affect trade between Member States. It is possible, therefore, that such
action could escape the prohibition, but this would depend on the facts
in each case. But, as the Common Market economy becomes more integrated, interstate effects will probably be more readily discovered. If
the abuse has no interstate effects, it must be dealt with under national
law, if at all. In a particular case, the abuse may arise from restrictive
agreements, in which case the provisions of article 85 (1) would also
apply. However, a cartel which may be unobjectionable under article
85 (1) could fall within the prohibition of article 86 if it had a dominant position and abused it.
Dominant Position
The Treaty contains no definition of the term "dominant position,"
although by analogy with article 66(7) of the European Coal and Steel
Community Treaty it may be interpreted as "not subject to substantial
competition." It may depend on whether more than fifty per cent of the
market is in the hands of the enterprise or enterprises involved. The
Commission will probably consider the comparative importance of the
firm in the Common Market in relation to a particular product or service. Additionally, the existence and importance of competitors inside
and outside the Common Market, and the opportunities available to
22.

Regulation 141, arts. 2, 3.
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customers to substitute other products are important factors for consideration.
Improper Practices
The exact interpretation of the terms "substantial" and "improper
advantage" remains unclear. The term "action" would no doubt include the acquisition of competing firms by stock purchase, mergers, or
agreements. It should be noted, however, that article 86, unlike article
85 which applies only where two or more enterprises are involved, is
applicable to situations where just one enterprise is involved. As in the
case of article 85 (1), the general prohibitory clause is followed by an
indicative and non-exhaustive list of practices in which misuse of a
dominant position may be discovered. Such improper practices may consist of:
(a) the direct or indirect imposition of any inequitable purchase
or selling prices or of any other inequitable trading conditions;
(b) the limitation of production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of consumers;
(c) the application to parties to transactions of unequal terms
in respect of equivalent supplies, thereby placing them at a competitive
disadvantage;
(d) the subjecting of the conclusion of a contract to the acceptance, by a party, of additional supplies which, either by their nature
or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject
of such contract.
Article 86 is therefore of similar structure to article 85 (1), and the
same general problems of interpretation and relationship arise between
the various clauses.
The first two practices listed under article 86 include abusive action
by dominant enterprises in which artificial scarcities or other misuses of
economic power are utilized in cases where the enterprises involved are
not acting in pursuance of agreements or in concert with other enterprises. The specific examples listed in article 86 are appropriate to
cover situations in which an enterprise with dominant market power
exacts terms for its own benefit from its suppliers or customers, as
opposed to situations in which terms are imposed on another party
which must be observed in that party's dealings with third parties.
It will be seen that the elastic terminology of article 86 affords
wide scope for action by the Commission. But article 86 is limited to
some extent by the terms of articles 90(1) and 90(2) which provide
special treatment for enterprises charged with the management of services of general public interest or possessing the characteristics of fiscal
monopolies. Although action of the type prohibited by article 86 may
usually have a greater impact on the economy than the arrangements
prohibited by article 85 (1), it is considered that at this early stage in

1964]

Fryer, Antitrust and the Treaty of Rome

the implementation of the antitrust rules, the Commission will be more
concerned with infringements of article 85 (1), especially in view of
the volume of work entrusted to it in connection with the registration
of agreements.2" The Commission has given little guidance as to the
correct interpretation of article 86. It is anticipated that action under
article 86 will be taken largely as a result of complaints by private
informers, such as injured competitors or minority stockholders in firms
acquired by dominant enterprises.
Article 86 contains no provisions corresponding to articles 85 (2)
and 85 (3). Activities falling within article 86 are prohibited and no
question of nullity arises. There is no possibility of obtaining a dispensatory declaration of the type provided by article 85 (3).
ENFORCEMENT

Having considered the scope of articles 85 (1) and 86, it is appropriate to consider what provision is made for their observance. Under article
89 of the Treaty, the Commission is required to ensure the application
of articles 85 and 86. The Commission may act either ex officio, or
on complaint by a Member State or private informer; it must also investigate all cases of alleged infringement. If the Commission discovers
an infringement of articles 85 and 86, it may render a decision requiring
the enterprises concerned to put an end to such infringement. But, before rendering such a decision, the Commission may make recommendations to the enterprises designed to put an end to their infringement.24
Penalties
Articles 11 and 14 of Regulation 17 give the Commission wide
powers to demand information in the execution of its duties and to conduct investigations into the affairs of enterprises. In the event of noncompliance, the Commission may make a decision setting a time limit
for compliance, specifying the sanctions applicable under articles 15
and 16 of the Regulation. Article 16 empowers the Commission, in
accordance with a decision rendered by it under article 3, to impose daily
penalties on infringing enterprises in order to require them to put an end
to infringements of articles 85 and 86. The Commission is also empowered under article 16 to impose daily penalties in order to require infringing enterprises to supply information requested by decision, " or to
submit to an investigation ordered by a decision.26 Fines may be imposed
23. Regulation
the Treaty.
24. Regulation
25. Regulation
26. Regulation

17 provides for the registration of agreements contravening art. 85(1) of
17, art. 3(3).
17, art. 11.
17, art. 14.
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upon enterprises for wilful or negligent submission of false information
to the Commission, either in connection with registration or when duly
requested by the Commission; or for wilful or negligent refusal to supply
information or to submit to investigation."
The Commission may by decision impose fines of from one thousand
to one million units of account2 8 on enterprises which have wilfully or
negligently infringed upon the provisions of article 85 (1) or article 86 of
the Treaty.2" This penalty applies to each of the enterprises which took
part in the infringement, and it may be increased to ten per cent of the
turnover for the preceding business year. Therefore the Commission
must give reasoned decisions so that questions of Treaty interpretation
may be determined, if necessary, by the Court of Justice under article 177
of the Treaty; or to enable enterprises to appeal from decisions affecting
them to the Court of Justice under article 173. Recommendations made
by the Commission under Regulation 17 (3) are not, however, appealable to the Court under article 173.
Before imposing the fines and penalties provided for in Regulation
17(15) and 17(16), the Commission must request the Consultative
Committee on Controls and Monopolies comprised of experts from each
Member State to render an opinion.3" It is intended that this procedure
will insure uniformity and provide a safeguard against abuse. Under
Regulation 17(17), the Court of Justice is given full jurisdiction to
adjudicate an appeal from decisions of the Commission fixing a fine or
penalty, and it may cancel, reduce or increase such fine or penalty.
Hearing
Regulation 17(19) requires that before the Commission may come
to a decision on questions involving the grant of negative clearance, the
termination of infringements of articles 85 and 86, the grant of a dispensatory declaration under article 85 (3), the retroactive exemption of
modified agreements, the revocation of article 85 (3) exemption, or the
imposition of fines and penalties, an opportunity must be provided for
the enterprises involved and interested third parties to be heard.
Regulation 17(24) gives the Commission authority to introduce
implementing provisions concerning the hearings provided for in articles
19(1) and 19(2) of Regulation 17, and in accordance with this authority Regulation 99 was made effective from August 30, 1963. Regulation 99 ensures that hearings will be conducted on uniform principles
and that enterprises will be informed of their rights and the grounds of
27.
28.
29.
30.

Regulation 17, art. 15.
A unit of account is the gold value of the U.S. dollar of 1958.
Regulation 17, art. 15 (2).
Regulation 17, arts. 10(3) to 10(5).
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complaint against them. Such enterprises are given an opportunity, in
common with other persons who can establish a justified interest, to
present their point of view in written representations to the Commission."' Regulation 99(4) provides that in reaching a decision, the
Commission may only consider the grounds of complaint in which the
parties involved have had an opportunity to express their views. In
addition to the submission of written representations, Regulation 99(7)
provides that enterprises may request that their views be developed
orally before the Commission, and the Commission must agree to such
request if it proposes to impose fines or penalties on such enterprises,
or if the parties establish sufficient grounds for an oral hearing. Enterprises may employ any representative approved by the Commission to
state their case."
It will be seen from the above that the Commission is well equipped
to deal with infringements of articles 85 and 86. It is relevant to consider, therefore, what action should be taken by enterprises whose activities appear to be prohibited by articles 85 and 86.
ALTERNATIVES FOR CONTRAVENING ENTERPRISES

If it is considered that the activities of the enterprise contravene
article 86, the only alternative is either to modify or terminate the activities so that the prohibition is no longer applicable, or to continue with
the contravention, if it is of a continuing nature. However, by so doing
the enterprise may incur the risk of sanctions in the event of the contravention being brought to the notice of the Commission. The gravity
of the contravention and its duration would be taken into account by
the Commission when imposing fines under Regulation U." If the
parties wish to confirm their view that article 86 does not apply in a
particular case, they may request a negative clearance from the Commission under Regulation 17 (2). In effect, this clearance is a statement
by the Commission that it sees no reason, on the basis of the available
information, for intervention under article 86." However, a negative
clearance is only of persuasive authority in municipal courts.
Enterprises whose activities appear to contravene the prohibition of
article 85 (1) will be concerned not only with the possibility of sanctions with respect to the contravention, but also with the consequences
of nullity. Additional courses of action are, however, open to them in
view of the provisions of article 85 (3) and the enforcement and registration procedures introduced by Regulation 17.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Regulation 99, arts. 1-3.
Regulation 99, art. 9(2).
Regulation 17, art. 15 (2).
There is no prescribed form for applying for negative clearance under article 86 of the

Treaty.
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If it is clear to the parties to an agreement that the agreement is not
subject to the prohibition of article 85 (1), no action need be taken. It
will not be subject to the prohibition if it is an agreement of the type
which the Commission has expressly excluded from the prohibition,"
or further, if it does not satisfy the general conditions of applicability
prescribed by article 85 (1). In many instances, however, the parties will
not be able to determine with any certainty whether article 85 (1) applies.
It will be remembered that article 85 (2) declares that arrangements falling within article 85 (1) shall be null and void. By virtue of article 1
of Regulation 1736 when read in conjunction with the decision of the
Court of Justice in Bosch and Van Rijn v. De Geus,"7 all agreements falling within article 85 (1) and not duly notified to the Commission are,
subject to certain exceptions, null and void with respect to any period of
operation after March 13, 1962, the effective date of Regulation 17.
Notification for Grant of Exemption
Three broad courses of action are available to the parties to an agreement which appears to fall within article 85 (1). The parties may either
discontinue or modify the agreement, or proceed with it in spite of the
prohibition; or the parties may apply to the Commission for a grant of
exemption under article 85 (3). If the agreement is in fact prohibited
by article 85 (1), and the parties wish to sustain it free from liability
of sanctions and the consequences of nullity, their only course is to apply
for a dispensatory declaration under article 85(3). The Commission
has sole power to grant exemption under article 85 (3) 38 and before exemption can be granted the agreement must be notified to the Commission.39 Notification is, however, not compulsory. If the parties think
that their agreement may possibly be subject to article 85 (1) and may
be entitled to exemption under article 85 (3), they should apply to the
Commission for a dispensatory declaration by filing Form B prescribed
by Regulation 27.
The procedure for notification depends on the date on which the
agreement came into force. Agreements in force on March 13, 1962
for which article 85 (3) exemption is required should have been notified
by the dates prescribed in article 5 of Regulation 17, as amended.
35. See Statements on exclusive agency and patent license agreements, supra notes 9-12.
36. Regulation 17, art. 1 provides: "The agreements, decisions and concerted practices referred to in Article 85, paragraph 1 of the Treaty and any abuse of a dominant position on
the market within the meaning of Article 86 of the Treaty shall be prohibited, no prior decision to this effect being required; Articles 6, 7 and 23 of the present Regulation shall not
be affected by this provision."
37. Case No. 13/61, April 6, 1962, Ct. of Justice.
38. Regulation 17, art. 9(1).
39. Regulation 17, art. 4(1).
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Agreements duly notified to the Commission will be presumed temporarily valid until and unless the Commission refuses to grant exemption under article 85 (3). Timely registration of agreements in force
on March 13, 196240 is of crucial effect since if article 85 (3) exemption
is granted, the decision granting exemption would have retroactive
effect to a date even earlier than the date of notification, and presumably even back to March 13, 1962.41 Thus, it would be possible
for a grant of exemption under article 85 (3) to validate the agreement
for the whole period of its operation after March 13, 1962. There is
no need for the agreement to be validated for any earlier period in view
of the decision in the Bosch case. Moreover, article 7 (1) of Regulation
17 provides that this same retroactive effect can be obtained for agreements which, although in their original form did not satisfy the requirements of article 85 (3), have been modified at the suggestion of the Commission to conform to such requirements. It should be noted, however,
that such retroactive validation of modified agreements is ineffective
against persons who have not expressly agreed to the registration. If the
Commission refuses to grant an exemption under article 85 (3) to a duly
notified agreement in force on March 13, 1962, such agreement would
be null and void for the whole period of its operation subsequent to that
date. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the Commission may not levy
fines for infringements of article 85 (1) with respect to activities within
the period subsequent to notification, whether or not article 85 (3) exemption is subsequently granted.4" Nor may it levy fines with respect
to any period of prohibited activity prior to notification if the agreement
was notified by the due dates.43 This immunity from fines applies so long
as the parties' activities remain within those described in the notification,
and so long as the Commission has not informed the parties in a
preliminary opinion that a grant of exemption under article 85 (3) would
be unwarranted.44 These preliminary opinions which are issued pursuant
to article 15 (6) of Regulation 17 are in the nature of cease and desist
orders. Agreements in force on March 13, 1962 which violate article
85 (1) and which were not registered by the dates prescribed, are automatically null and void as from March 13, 1962 without any decision
being necessary. This flows from the decision in the Bosch45 case and
article 1 of Regulation 17. Hence, it is no longer possible to apply for
a grant of article 85(3) exemption with respect to these agreements.
40. The deadline was November 1, 1962 for agreements to which more than two enterprises
take part, it was February 1, 1963 for bipartite agreements.
41. Regulation 17, art. 6(2).
42. Regulation 17, art. 15(5) (a).
43. Regulation 17, art 15(5) (b).
44. Regulation 17, art. 15 (6).
45. Case No. 13/61, April 6, 1962, Ct. of Justice.
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Parties to such agreements which have not been notified should, therefore, take steps to terminate them by mutual consent and enter into new
agreements which should be notified to the Commission.
Agreements entered into after March 13, 1962 and subject to article
85 (1) are automatically null and void from the date of their inception,
unless and until they are notified. Under article 9 of Regulation 17, the
Commission has exclusive power to grant article 85(3) exemption,
and under the terms of article 4 of Regulation 17 notification is a prerequisite to the grant of a dispensatory declaration. Such arrangements
should be registered before or as soon as possible after they come into
force. If and when an article 85 (3) exemption is granted, such arrangements may be validated retroactively, but exemption affords only
retroactive validity from the date of registration; the agreement cannot
be validated for any earlier period.4" If, therefore, an agreement is in
operation for some period prior to registration, it will be prohibited and
null and void for the period between its inception and its registration,
even if the Commission grants exemption under article 85 (3). Thus, if
an agreement which may potentially satisfy the requirements for article
85 (3) exemption is not registered, it is automatically null and void for
the entire period of its operation prior to its eventual registration.
RegistrationProcedure
In view of the possibility that the Commission may refuse to grant
article 85 (3) exemption, it is particularly important to notify agreements made subsequent to March 13, 1962 as soon as possible after they
come into force. In the event of such refusal, the agreement is presumed
to be subject to the prohibition of article 85 (1) for the whole period of
its operation. It should be noted that once such an agreement has been
registered, whether before or after it has come into operation, and
whether or not article 85 (3) exemption is eventually granted, the Commission may not levy fines with respect to activities which occurred during the period subsequent to registration; however, the Commission may
levy fines in respect of any period of prohibited activity prior to registration.4 7 This immunity from fines for activities which occurred during
the period subsequent to registration applies so long as the parties' activities remain within those described in the registration, or so long as
the Commission has not informed the parties in a preliminary opinion
that a grant of exemption would be unwarranted." Article 4(2) of
Regulation 27 requires that notifications for the purpose of obtaining a
grant of exemption under article 85 (3) be filed on Form B, the con46.
47.
48.

Regulation 17, art. 6.
Regulation 17, art. 15 (5) (a).
Regulation 17, art. 15 (6).
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tents of which are specified in Regulation 27. One or more of the
parties involved in an agreement may notify the agreement to the Commission on Form B and may argue that the agreement is not subject to
article 85 (1); or the parties may argue that if the agreement is so subject, it is entitled to a grant of exemption under article 85 (3). A nodfication which merely requests that an exemption be granted under
article 85 (3) does not constitute an admission by the parties that the
agreement is subject to article 85 (1). Although the Form requires considerable information as to the parties' business operations, it is imperative that the arguments adduced in support of either the inapplicability
of article 85 (1), or entitlement to article 85 (3) exemption should be
carefully and fully set forth, in view of the danger of the Commission
refusing to grant article 85 (3) exemption on the basis of the information provided, and the right of the parties to appeal the decision of the
Commission to the Court of Justice. 9 Notification involves considerable
publicity, and the decisions reached by the Commission must be published,"0 although safeguards are provided to protect business secrets."
It is understood that the certainty of publicity has deterred many enterprises from registering their agreements.
Exclusive Distributorships.-A-simplified registration procedure has,
however, been established under Form BI for certain exclusive distributorship agreements.52 This simplified procedure requires only that the name,
status, and address of the notifiant be stated, together with a description
of the goods subject to the agreement, the name and address of the distributor, and the date of the contract. Provision is also made under Form
B1 for block notification of standard contracts; in this event the Form must
state the number of standard contracts concluded at the time of notification.
However, this Form is only appropriate for bipartite exclusive distributorship agreements under which unilateral or mutual restrictions are accepted
by the parties as to the exclusive purchase and/or supply of specific
goods for resale within a defined territory in the Common Market. The
Form requires the applicant to certify that no mutual restrictions as
to the distribution of competing goods manufactured by the parties have
been established; that the agreement does not prevent dealers or consumers from obtaining the goods subject to the contract from other
distributors or dealers in the Common Market; that the distributor is
not prohibited from supplying the goods to clients outside his defined
territory; and that the contract imposes no obligations on the distributor
as to resale price maintenance. A notification on Form B1 is equivalent
49.
50.
51.
52.

Treaty art. 173.
Regulation 17, art. 21.
Regulation 17, art. 20.
Regulation 153, amending Regulation 27.
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to notification on Form B so far as immunity from penalties is concerned.
Parties entitled to give notification on Form B1 may, if they wish, notify
in the usual way on Form B. It will be seen that few enterprises will
be entitled to use Form B1. A favorable decision by the Commission
on a notification under Forms B or B1 is of conclusive validity in the
municipal courts of the Member States.
Negative Clearance.-Article 2 of Regulation 17 provides that the
Commission may issue a negative clearance when an agreement is notified
on Form A. Such a clearance is merely an expression of opinion by the
Commission that there is no reason to take action against the agreement
under article 85 (1) on the basis of the available information. Notification on Form A is in no way equivalent to notification on Forms B and B1,
and such a clearance is only of persuasive authority in municipal courts.
There is a right of appeal to the Court of Justice against the Commission's
refusal to grant such a clearance. 3 Notification on Form A is likely to be
of use only to enterprises who are reasonably confident that their activities
fall outside article 85(1), and merely require confirmation of that
opinion. In other cases there seems to be no purpose in notifying on
Form A; equal publicity is given to the Commission's decision as in the
case of Form B notification, and the information required is equally comprehensive. Though Forms A and B can be submitted simultaneously, a
declaration that article 85 (1) is inapplicable can be obtained in a
proper case under Form B notification. Moreover, the use of Form B
can guard against a finding that article 85 (1) applies, since such a notification can lead to the grant of a dispensatory declaration under
article 85 (3).
ARTICLE

85 (3)

Parties to arrangements falling within article 85 (1) will, of course,
be concerned to know whether the arrangement is likely to satisfy the
terms of article 85 (3) which provide as follows:
Nevertheless, the provisions of paragraph I may be declared inapplicable
in the case of:
- any agreement or classes of agreements between enterprises,
any decisions or classes of decisions by associations of enterprises, and
-

any concerted practices or classes of concerted practices which con-

tribute to the improvement of the production or distribution of goods
or to the promotion of technical or economic progress while reserving
to users an equitable share in the profit resulting therefrom, and which:

(a)

neither impose on the enterprises concerned any restrictions

not indispensable to the attainment of the above objectives;

(b)

nor enable such enterprises to eliminate competition in re-

spect of a substantial proportion of the goods concerned.

The Commission must grant exemption if the conditions of article
53.

Treaty art. 173.
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85 (3) are fulfilled. In setting out reasons in justification of a grant of
exemption, parties should attempt to show that the effect of their agreement is to improve product quality or distribution, to coordinate inventories, to take advantage of bulk contracts, to reduce costs, or to introduce new technical processes. They must show that an equitable share
in the resulting profit is reserved to users, and that the benefits derived
from the agreement are not restricted to the participants. For this purpose, evidence of price reductions, the production of new articles, and
improvements in availability and service would be appropriate to show
a benefit to consumers. The parties' should explain why the restrictions
contained in the agreement are essential to the attainment of such benefits.
In order that the Commission may determine whether the agreement
enables the participants to eliminate competition with respect to a
substantial proportion of the goods concerned, it will be necessary to
provide detailed information as to the economic position of the enterprises involved. Evidence as to the number of, independent enterprises
offering identical or similar products or services and the quantity of
products offered will be relevant. The Commission will base its decision
on economic considerations and will, no doubt, take account of the size
of the enterprises involved, their turnover in the particular product or
service, and their share of the total production or supply of services in
the relevant sector, the importance of trade between Member States in
that sector, and the degree of competition which the agreement permits
between the participants and between non-participants. The Commission can require that the participants supply any information which it
requires for this purpose. In accordance with article 8 of Regulation
17, a decision to give a dispensatory declaration under article 85 (3) is
to be valid for a specified period, normally three years. During the
specified period, the agreement cannot be impugned under article 85 (1),
and no fines can be imposed for activities during that period. The Commission may, however, revoke or vary its decision in the event of a
fundamental change in the factual situation, or upon an infringement
of a condition attached to the decision, or upon the grounds that a
decision has been procured on the basis of false information.
In its first statement dealing with patent licensing agreements,. the
Commission proposed to grant to certain categories of such agreements,
group exemption under article 85 (3) for a period of three years. It
will be remembered, however, that in its second statement dealing with
patent licensing agreements,5 5 the Commission proposed to treat certain
restrictions imposed on the licensee in individual contracts as being alto54. 113 Officil Gazette 2628.
55. Ibid.
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gether outside the prohibition of article 85 (1). In its subsequent statement of December 24, 1962, the Commission declared that the prohibition of article 85 (1) would be inapplicable to all the clauses in patent
license agreements which were referred to in the first and second statements. Thus, the clauses specified in the first statement for which group
exemption was originally envisaged, are now altogether outside the prohibition of article 85 (1).
In its first statement' concerning exclusive distributorship agreements, the Commission proposed to grant group exemption under article
85 (3) to certain categories of such agreements for a period of three
years. In view of the provisions of article 87(2) (c) of the Treaty,
which provide that the Council shall have jurisdiction to make regulations and directions, it was doubted whether it was within the legal
power of the Commission to grant group exemptions under article 85 (3)
without the necessity of prior notification. The Commission now proposes to submit a regulation to the Council which would establish a
procedure for granting such group exemptions. It is, however, instructive to examine the exclusive distributorship agreements which were the
subject of the Commission's proposals for it is likely that blanket exemption will be afforded to them at a future date, and the concepts of the
proposed group exemption are reflected in Regulation 153 which provides for the use of the simplified Form B1.
In order to qualify for exemption, the enterprises involved must not
occupy a dominant position within the meaning of article 86, and the
agreements must be bipartite for the exclusive purchase and/or supply
of specific goods for resale in a defined part of the Common Market.
It appears, however, that a network of distributorships would not be
objectionable provided each is bilateral and complies with the other
stipulated conditions. The agreements must contain no reciprocal restrictions on the distribution of competitive products manufactured by
the parties, and must provide that the restrictions contained therein are
not enforceable against third parties. This is intended to prevent parties
from resorting to national law which might give an exclusive distributor
a right of action against persons importing the same goods into his territory. The agreement must not contain any clauses more restrictive
than those listed in parts A and B of the statement. It is interesting to
note from the listed clauses that the Commission regarded it as permissible
to impose obligations on the distributor not to make, distribute, or act
for the duration of the contract as a representative for products which
are directly competitive to those to which the contract relates, and not
to advertise the product under contract in his own name outside the territory allocated to him. Moreover, the statement envisaged that obligations
56.

Id. at 2627.
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could be imposed on the distributor as to after-sales service and the giving
of guarantees, provided the distributor was to make these services available
to users of the products within his territory, even if they had not been
obtained through him.
It must be emphasized that as the Commission has withdrawn its
group exemption proposals, the categories discussed in the preceding
paragraph have no legal significance at present. They are referred to
merely to illustrate the Commission's attitude and as an aid in forecasting future developments.
Exclusive distributorship agreements are only entitled to special treatment if they involve commercial agents, although parties to those exclusive distributorship agreements which satisfy the requirements of
Regulation 153 may, of course, take advantage of the simplified registration procedure by filing Form BI. In other cases the agreements should
be notified in the usual manner on Form B. However, Form BI will
not be appropriate if the agreement contains resale price maintenance
provisions.
AGREEMENTS EXEMPT FROM NOTIFICATION

This survey has so far ignored the special provisions contained in
Regulation 17 exempting certain categories of agreement from notification. It -is important to consider them at this point.
The exempted categories are listed in article 4(2) of Regulation 17.
The effect of Regulation 17 is to exempt these agreements from the
general rule that agreements falling within article 85 (1) must be notified, or incur the sanction of nullity in default of notification. These
agreements must be regarded as conditionally valid, since, even though
they may fall within the prohibition of article 85 (1), they are not to be
treated as null and void by municipal courts for want of notification to
the Commission. It is not, however, intended that these agreements shall
be permanently exempted from the general rules of notification, and
article 22 of Regulation 17 expressly provides for proposals to be submitted by the Commission to the Council to bring certain categories of
these agreements within the ambit of the general rules.
Article 4(2) of Regulation 17 defines the agreements as follows:
Paragraph I shall not be applicable to agreements, decisions and
concerted practices where:
(1) enterprises of only one Member State take part and where
such agreements, decisions, and practices involve neither imports nor
exports between Member States;
(2) only two enterprises take part and the sole effect of these
agreements is:
(a) to restrict the freedom of one party to the contract to fix
prices or conditions of trading in the resale of goods which have been
acquired from the other party to the contract, or
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(b) to impose restraint on the exercise of the rights of any person acquiring or using the industrial property rights - particularly
patents, utility models, registered designs or trade marks - or on the
exercise of the rights of any person entitled, under a contract, to acquire
or use manufacturing processes or knowledge relating to the utilization
or application of industrial techniques;
(3) their sole object is:
(a) the development or the uniform application of standards
and types,

(b) joint research to improve techniques, provided that the result is accessible to all parties and that each of them can exploit it.
It appears that the inclusion of agreements specified in article 4,
paragraph 2(1) in the category of agreements exempt from notification
is of little value, since such purely national agreements which do nor
affect imports or exports between Member States have only intrastate
effects, and consequently are outside the prohibition of article 85 (1).
Their inclusion in article 4 is, therefore, immaterial.
To claim relief under category 2(2) (a), only two enterprises must
participate; but, whether they are located in different Member States is
immaterial. The goods concerned must have been acquired from the
other party to the contract. This category would be useful insofar as
resale price maintenance agreements are concerned were it not for the
words "sole effect." Relief can therefore be claimed only if the agreement imposes no additional restriction, such as a prohibition on exports.
The term "sole effect" similiarly restricts the scope of category
2(2) (b), since it is rare to find a patent licensing agreement which
contains no restrictions on sale or distribution. This category should,
however, be considered in light of the Commission's statement of December 24, 1962, removing certain clauses in patent licensing agreements from the scope of article 85(1). Nevertheless, the category
still has some relevance, for it applies also to agreements involving industrial property of all types, and not merely to patents. It would appear
that restrictions imposed on the grantee of such rights which result directly from the grantor's exercise of his industrial property rights will be
entitled to relief. This would include restrictions as to territory, duration, and quantity. The Commission intends to consider the position of
restrictions of similar nature to those specified in its statement of December 24, 1962, which are included in industrial property agreements
but do not relate to patent licenses. It may be that such restrictions will
be declared to be outside article 86(1). In that event this category of
exemption would become superfluous.
Agreements which fall into the above categories are not to be treated
as null and void for want of notification. Such agreements, whether
in force on March 13, 1962 or entered into subsequently, may, at the option
of the parties, be notified to the Commission at any time to secure a declara-
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tion that article 85 (1) does not apply, or to obtain a grant of exemption
under article 85 (3). It is not possible to claim a grant of exemption
unless and until they are notified. In spite of their conditional validity,
the Commission may investigate such agreements at any time and hold that
they contravene article 85 (1) ."2
Regulation 17 draws a distinction between exempt agreements in
force on March 13, 1962 and those entered into subsequently. Agreements of the latter type, if notified and granted article 85 (3) exemption,
may receive the benefit of a retroactive exemption effective from the date
on which the agreement satisfied the requirements of article 85 (3). This
may be earlier than the date of notification, and may in fact cover the
whole period of the agreement's operation." If, however, article 85 (3)
exemption is refused, the agreement will be regarded as prohibited from
its inception. No fines can be imposed for the period of activity after
notification. 9 If on the other hand, the agreement is challenged by the
Commission before it is notified and is found to be within article 85 (1),
fines can be imposed for the period prior to notification, unless the Commission finds that the agreement fulfilled the requirements of article 85 (3)
during that period.
Agreements in force on March 13, 1962, if notified, may similarly
receive the benefit of a retroactive exemption under article 85 (3) with
an immunity from fines for the period after notification. Additional
benefits may, however, be obtained for such agreements if they are notified prior to January 1, 1967. In the first place, no fines may be imposed for any period prior to notification."0 If not notified by that date,
the immunity from fines applies only to the period subsequent to notification. Second, duly notified agreements may be entitled to a retroactive grant of exemption under the provisions of article 7 of Regulation 17. Under this article, agreements which are duly notified to the
Commission, and which do not meet the requirements of article 85 (3) in
their original form may be terminated or modified to meet these requirements. In such event, retroactive validity may be given to the agreement
as modified.6"
Reference has been made throughout this survey to the sanction of
nullity with respect to agreements prohibited by article 85 (1). The
municipal courts of the Member States are required to give effect to the
provisions of the Treaty in any suit, and in case of conflict between the
57. Regulation 17, art. 9(2).
58. Regulation 17, art. 6(2).
59. Regulation 17, art. 15(5) (a).
60. Regulation 17, art. 15(5) (b).
61. The due date for notification provided by Regulation 17, art. 7 (2) was originally January 1, 1964, but was amended to January 1, 1967 by Regulation 118/63, made on November
5, 1963.
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municipal law and the Treaty, the Treaty provisions shall prevail. If,
therefore, an agreement is challenged in a municipal court on the
grounds of its invalidity under article 85 (1), the municipal court will
determine whether the agreement does in fact violate article 85 (1). If
it does, the court will declare the agreement to be null and void. The
rights of the parties will then depend on the appropriate municipal law
which will govern questions such as severability and the recoupment of
payments made under the agreement. A finding of nullity could, therefore, have a serious effect in cases where a substantial credit balance is outstanding, or where valuable technical information has been transmitted.
However, the municipal courts have shown some reluctance to declare
agreements invalid under article 85 (1) in the absence of further clarification of the scope of the prohibition by the Court of Justice in its exercise of interpretative jurisdiction under article 177 of the Treaty.
CONCLUSION

It is clear that the Commission is now entrusted with effective powers
to protect competition within the European Economic Community, and
enterprises whose activities fall within its jurisdiction must take steps
to acquaint themselves and comply with the provisions of articles 85
and 86 or incur the risk of penalties, thereby disturbing their normal
contractual and business arrangements. It is equally obvious that the
Commission will encounter considerable difficulty in satisfying itself
of the correct interpretation of the Treaty provisions. In view of
the paucity of intrepretive decisions by the Court of Justice, and the
reluctance of the Commission to clarify the scope of article 85 (1) and
particularly article 86, it would be premature to forecast at the present
time the probable trend of administrative action. The Commission has
stated that it wishes to proceed pragmatically, and it seems likely that
the vague scope of article 85 (1) and the dragnet created by the notification requirements will bring restrictive arrangements to the notice of the
Commission in such numbers that the Commission will use the information so provided as a basis for future statements of principle. It should
be remembered, however, that a more favorable attitude toward cartels
has prevailed in Europe in the past than has existed in the United States.
Therefore, it is submitted that economic considerations will significantly
influence the Commission, particularly in the granting of exemptions
under article 85 (3).

